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Compounding the Error: "Deliberate
Indifference" vs. "Discriminatory Animus"
Under Title II of the ADA
NINA GOLDEN*

ne incorrect decision reached by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in 1998 has created a quagmire of cases over the past five years. In
Fergusonv. City of Phoenix,' the court decided that a plaintiff suing
under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") 2 had to
prove intentional discrimination in order to recover compensatory damages.
This decision resulted in an ongoing struggle in the courts about how to
define intentional discrimination. But the struggle was unnecessary. Title
II of the ADA does not require intentional discrimination and the courts
never should have applied any analysis of the type of discrimination
perpetuated by Title II defendants.
This article will first set forth the background and history of the
Ferguson decision. Next, it will examine the fallout from that decision:
five years of cases that make clear how the Ninth Circuit erred in its
approach to Title II. Finally, this article will address appropriate solutions
to the problem created by the court when it required proof of intentional
discrimination before allowing recovery of compensatory damages in Title
II cases.
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

For over ten years, the ADA has been in effect to prevent
discrimination against people with disabilities. Signed into law by
President Bush in 1990, the ADA was intended to provide people with
disabilities specific legal rights that they had been denied up until that
time.3 The ADA was in large part based on section 504 of the
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Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 1998).
1.
2.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
3.
Nancy Lee Jones, Overview and Essential Requirements of the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 471 (1991).
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Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibited discrimination against people
with disabilities by recipients of federal financial assistance.4 Section 504
asserts the right of all people with disabilities to receive equal opportunities
to participate in any activity or program receiving federal financial
assistance or those conducted by an executive agency. It also prohibits
programs from providing different or separate assistance to, and retaliation
against, people who assert section 504 rights.5 To establish a section 504
violation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is an individual with a
disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to receive the benefit; (3) he was
denied the benefits of the program solely by reason of his disability; and (4)
the program receives federal financial assistance. 6 The regulations place
additional requirements on covered entities, such as requiring that they be
readily accessible to people with disabilities.7 Despite the apparent
strength of both section 504 and its implementing regulations, in practice
they had little if any effect on the millions of people with disabilities.
Because section 504 was not very successful in achieving its stated
purpose, 8 Congress determined that much more was necessary to eliminate
discrimination against people with disabilities.
In enacting the ADA, Congress relied on its power under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. 9
Congress has the power, as provided by section 5, to enact "appropriate
legislation" to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's provisions. 0 The
ADA's fourth statutory purpose indicates Congress's intent to do so by
referencing this authority." In order to uphold a statute as an exercise of
section 5 authority, the Supreme Court has held that it must "be able to
discern some legislative purpose or factual predicate that supports the
exercise of that power."' 2 Regulating state and local government activities,
which constitute state action, Title II of the ADA "falls within the scope of
congressional authority to enact legislation that Congress deems

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
28 C.F.R. § 42.503(b) (1999).
29 U.S.C. § 794.
28 C.F.R. § 42.521(a).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2).

9.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
10. Id.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (citing Congress's power under the Fourteenth
Amendment as the authority to enact the ADA).
12. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983).
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the equal protection guarantee of the [F]ourteenth
appropriate to implement
13
[A]mendment.'
Stated as its first statutory purpose, the ADA is intended "to provide a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 14 The ADA's second
purpose is "to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 15
Unfortunately, many courts have developed a pattern over the years since
the ADA's passage to enforce standards addressing disability
discrimination in a manner that does not support the ADA's stated
purposes. Instead of enforcing the ADA as written and as intended by
Congress, the courts have created additional hurdles that plaintiffs must
overcome before prevailing in an ADA suit. By doing so, the courts have
interpreted the ADA to provide much more limited protections to people
with disabilities than Congress intended.' 6 One of the many reasons for
this result stems from the court's misinterpretation of what a Title II
plaintiff must prove in order to recover compensatory damages. Title 11
prohibits all local and state governments from discriminating against
people with disabilities, providing that "no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation
in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity."' 7 In
order to prove that a public program or service has violated Title II, the
plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability;
(2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a
public entity's services, programs or activities, or was otherwise
discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of
benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability.18

13.

Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and

18.

Id.

Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413,
439 (1991).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2).
16. See Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA 's Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the
Civil Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335 (2001) for a thorough analysis of why the
ADA has not achieved its goals and why the courts have limited its impact.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
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Admittedly, Congress failed to state clearly its intention regarding
remedies for Title H violations. 19 Instead of simply stating what should be
the appropriate Title II remedies, Congress referenced section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section
504 applies to recipients of-federal financial assistance, 20 while Title VI
prohibits race discrimination by programs receiving federal funds. 2' Title
II of the ADA states that "[tihe remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in
[section 504] shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights this subchapter
provides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in
violation of section 12132. "22 Section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act states
that section 504 remedies are coextensive with those remedies in Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act. Section 505 provides that, "[t]he remedies,
procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"
are available. 23 To further confuse matters, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
does not have a remedies provision. However, by the time the ADA was
enacted, there existed well-established judicial remedies for Title VI
violations. 24 "By incorporating one section after another by referencesections that mesh 25
only imperfectly-Congress could not have made its
intention less clear.,
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT
The Supreme Court has yet to determine if Congress intended for all
Title II plaintiffs to be able to recover compensatory damages, or only
those who were victims of intentional discrimination. In examining the

19. In contrast, Congress did limit remedies for Title I to intentional violations. See
generally 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b). Title III remedies are those contained in Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 which limits relief to "preventive relief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a).
20. Section 504 provides:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive
agency or by the United States Postal Service.
29 U.S.C. § 794.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 12133.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2).
24. See, e.g., Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 118 F.3d 1400 (10th Cir. 1997).
25. Id. at 1409 (Jenkins, J., dissenting).
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legislative history of Title II, it becomes apparent that Congress had no
intention of limiting compensatory damages only to those plaintiffs who
were victims of intentional discrimination. Although the congressional
committees did not specifically discuss remedies, they did cite Alexander v.
interpretation of section 504 that it intended
Choate26 as the "definitive
27
[T]itle II to copy."
The Supreme Court in Choate determined that some actions that had a
disparate impact on people with disabilities could be a section 504
violation. 28 In deciding that a public entity could be liable for actions that
were not intentionally discriminatory, the Court noted that
"[d]iscrimination against the handicapped was perceived by Congress to be
most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of
thoughtlessness and indifference-of benign neglect., 29 The Court also
observed that "much of the conduct that Congress sought to alter in passing
the Rehabilitation Act would be difficult if not impossible to reach were the
Act construed to proscribe only conduct fueled by a discriminatory
intent., 30 By referencing Choate in its discussion of Title II, Congress
indicated that victims of unintentional discrimination should be afforded
Title II's protection against disability discrimination. Because of the
difficulty in clearly discerning Congress's intent regarding Title II
remedies, the courts have inappropriately ascribed to Title II a requirement
for the award of compensatory damages that is not supported by the ADA
itself - that the discrimination be intentional.31
Further support for the notion that Congress never intended to limit
the remedies available to Title II plaintiffs can be found in a House Report
discussing Title 11's effectiveness in combating discrimination. The House
Report noted: "As with section 504, there is also a private right of action
[under Title 11] for persons with disabilities, which includes the full

26.

Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).

27. Mark C. Weber, DisabilityDiscriminationby State and Local Government: The
Relationship Between Section 504 of the RehabilitationAct and Title H of the Americans

with Disabilities Act, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1089, 1115 (1995). "'It is . . . the
Committee's intent that section 202 also be interpreted consistent with Alexander v.
Choate."' Id. n.150 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 10 1-485, pt. 2, at 84 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 367).
28. Choate, 469 U.S. at 299.
29. Id. at 295.
30. Id. at 296-97.
31. Sande Buhai & Nina Golden, Adding Insult to Injury: DiscriminatoryIntent as
a Prerequisiteto Damages Under the ADA, 52 RUTGERS L. REv. 1121, 1133 (2000).
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panoply of remedies."32 Reference to "the full panoply of remedies" is
consistent with the traditional presumption that all appropriate remedies are
available when a plaintiff brings a claim under a federal statute.33
In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, a case concerning
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 34 the Supreme Court relied
on the traditional presumption in favor of "'any available remedy to make
good the wrong done."' 35 It held that an aggrieved party in a private cause
of action should be entitled to all appropriate remedies, "unless Congress
has expressly indicated otherwise. ' 3 The Court affirmed that "absent clear
direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the power to
award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought
pursuant to a federal statute. 37
Nowhere in the legislative history did Congress clearly direct that
plaintiffs bringing Title II claims are required to prove intentional
discrimination before they may be awarded compensatory damages. 38 Nor
is there one word or phrase in Title II of the ADA of section 504 limiting
the availability of compensatory damages to intentional discrimination
cases. 39 Judge Tashima noted in his dissent in Ferguson v. City of Phoenix:
Franklin indicates that the law always has been that all
appropriate remedies are available unless Congress has
said otherwise. Therefore, Congress would have expressly
limited Title II's remedies when it passed the ADA in
1990, if such limitation were intended. Instead, the "full
panoply of remedies" was intended to be available to
victims of disability discrimination when Title II was
violated.4 °
Where Congress has limited remedies available to private parties
bringing suit under Title III of the ADA, it has placed no such limitations

32. H. REP No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 98, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381
(emphasis added).
33. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 67-68 (1992).
34. Franklin, 503 U.S. 60.
35. Id. at 66 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).

36.

Id.

40.

Id. at 678.

37.
38.
39.

Id. at 70-71.
Ferguson, 157 F.3d at 676-77.
Id. at 676-677 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
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on private parties who are discriminated against in violation of Title 11.41
Congress amended Title I of the ADA to include compensatory relief when
it addressed remedies under the ADA in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. At
that time, Congress made no mention of Title HI, implying that no
42
amendment was necessary.
HI. FERGUSON V. CITY OF PHOENIX
The Supreme Court decisions on appropriate remedies available to
plaintiffs bringing private causes of action, the legislative history of the
ADA, and the text of the ADA itself all point to the same logical
conclusion. Plaintiffs alleging disability discrimination under Title II of the
ADA should not have to prove intentional discrimination in order for them
to receive compensatory damages. Amazingly, the Ninth Circuit Court in
Ferguson reached the exact opposite conclusion. In that case, three
separate deaf plaintiffs sued the City of Phoenix because the City's
emergency 911 services were effectively inaccessible to them, thus
constituting a violation of Title II of the ADA and section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.43 (One of the plaintiffs actually tried to apprehend two
thieves stealing his truck himself when he was continually disconnected
from 911, but he did not succeed.) 44 The district court held that because the
plaintiffs had failed to prove that the City had intentionally discriminated
against them, the plaintiffs could not recover compensatory damages.45
Affirming the lower court's decision on appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that only plaintiffs who show
discriminatory intent are entitled to compensatory damages for Title 11 and
section 504 violations.4 6 In reaching its decision, the Ferguson court failed
to recognize the significant differences between Title II of the ADA and
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and Title IX of the Education
Amendments. Both Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and Title IX of the
Education Amendments were promulgated under the Spending Clause and

41. See42U.S.C. § 12188(1994).
42. See Cheryl L. Anderson, Damages for Intentional Discrimination by Public
Entities Under Title II of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct: A Rose by Any Other Name,
but Are the Remedies the Same?, 9 BYU J. PUB. L. 235, 244 (1995) (concluding that Title II
incorporates an "appropriate relief' remedial standard under which attorney's fees may be
recovered, but punitive damages may not be).
43. Ferguson, 157 F.3d at 670-7 1.
44. Id. at 671.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 674.
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do not have an expressed private right of action,4 7 unlike Title II of the
ADA. The Ferguson court's failure to recognize this difference led it to
apply the analysis from three Supreme Court cases 48 dealing with Title VI
and Title IX that was inapplicable to a Title II case. 49 The court even
admitted that requiring actual notice and deliberate indifference in order to
recover damages in a Title IX case would be "clearer under Spending
Clause legislation due to the conditions imposed and accepted in advance
of receiving government financial assistance.,, 50 Despite the fact that the
ADA is not Spending Clause legislation and therefore would not have the
same issue of notice, the court still reached its erroneous conclusion: that
Title II of the ADA requires a showing of intentional discrimination before
compensatory damages may be awarded. By doing so, the Ferguson court
set the stage for the ongoing misapplication of this intentional
discrimination requirement in Title II cases.
The court in Ferguson refrained from determining which standard to
apply when deciding if a Title II defendant had intentionally discriminated
against an individual with a disability. It noted that the plaintiffs failed to
prove intentional discrimination using either the "deliberate indifference"
or "discriminatory animus" standard. Over the course of several cases,
the Ninth Circuit refused to specify which standard it would apply.5 2
Ultimately, the court did decide upon the "deliberate indifference"
standard, but the choice never should have been made. No standard need
be applied because proof of intentional discrimination should not be
required to recover compensatory damages in a Title II case.

47.

Edward S. Cheng, Boys Being Boys and Girls Being Girls - Student-to-Student

Sexual Harassmentfrom the Courtroom to the Classroom, 7 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 263, 292
(1997).
48. Guardians Ass'n v. City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. School
Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
49. See Buhai & Golden, supra note 31, for an in-depth discussion of the Ferguson
case and why the court's analysis was incorrect.
50. Ferguson, 157 F.3d at 676 (citing Guardians,463 U.S. at 596).
51. Id. at 675.
52. See Memmer v. Marin County Courts, 169 F.3d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1999);
Midgett v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist. Of Oregon, 254 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2001).
53. Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001).
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A. NINTH CIRCUIT CASES FOLLOWING FERGUSON

The first of four Ninth Circuit cases decided subsequent to Ferguson,
Memmer v. Marin County Courts,54 was decided in 1999. Carin Memmer
is visually impaired and cannot see clearly even with corrective lenses. She
cannot read either handwritten or typed documents. She has a disability as
defined by the ADA 55 and is entitled to its protection.
After her landlord brought an unlawful detainer action against her,
Memmer filed a "Request for Accommodations by Persons with
Disabilities" with the Marin County Municipal Court, which included a
request for a human reader of her choice. Present at her eviction trial was a
Spanish-language interpreter who was familiar with court proceedings.
Memmer refused his assistance without speaking to him, and requested a
different reader. 56 The trial judge granted her request, placing limitations
on Memmer's choice of readers because the man had a prior history of
being disruptive in court. With those limitations in place, the trial ensued
57
and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Memmer's landlord.
Both Memmer and her reader filed an action in United States District
Court stating a variety of claims. Primarily, they argued that the Marin
Court did not have proper procedures for dealing with accommodation
requests, and that the Spanish-language interpreter did not constitute a
reasonable accommodation. They sought both injunctive and monetary
damages. Her claims for injunctive relief were moot because the court
concluded that there was no longer an actual controversy since she had
been evicted over two years prior. However, because the ADA allows for
monetary damages in certain circumstances even when the discriminatory
58
was not moot.
conduct has ceased, her request for monetary damages
After finding that Memmer's reader lacked standing and dismissing
him from the suit, the district court also dismissed all but one of Memmer' s
claims. The court concluded that Memmer did state a cognizable claim
against the municipal court for not reasonably accommodating her
disability. After concluding that the municipal court's offer of a Spanishlanguage interpreter did constitute a reasonable accommodation, the district

54. 169 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1999).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (defining the term "disability," with respect to an individual,
as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded
as having such an impairment.").
56. Memmer, 169 F.3d at 631-32.
57. Id. at 632.
58. Id. at 632 n.3.
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court granted the municipal court's motion for summary judgment.
Memmer appealed the granting of the summary judgment motion, raising
only her ADA claims. 59
Of the two claims Memmer brought on appeal under Title II of the
ADA, only one relates to the decision in Ferguson. In that claim, Memmer
argued that the Marin Court discriminated against her in violation of the
ADA by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for her disability.
To prove her claim, the district court stated that Memmer had to address
two points. First, because Memmer had the burden of establishing the
ADA violation, she first had to show that there were specific
accommodations that the Main Court failed to provide. Second, following
the decision in Ferguson, the court determined that in order to prevail in a
suit for monetary damages Memmer would have to show that the Marin
Court intentionally discriminated against her. 60 The court commented that,
"[a]lthough Ferguson left unresolved the question of whether intentional
discrimination can be established only by proving discriminatory animus,
or whether deliberate indifference is sufficient [citation omitted], Ferguson
made clear that a plaintiff at least must establish deliberate indifference to
recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA.'
Memmer argued that the Marin Court's failure to provide any
accommodation during pre-trial proceedings constituted an ADA violation.
The district court found that none of the pre-trial hearings included any
activities that necessitated the Marin Court providing Memmer with
accommodations. Furthermore, the district court determined that even if
some accommodations might have been helpful during the hearings,
Memmer failed to provide evidence of the discriminatory intent necessary
to recover monetary damages, as required by Ferguson.6 2
Memmer also argued that the Main Court offering to provide her with
a Spanish-language interpreter to assist her with the trial did not constitute
a reasonable accommodation. She claimed that the Spanish-language
interpreter did not have the training necessary to assist her adequately, but
she never met with him to assess his ability to do so. The district court
concluded that because Memmer could not prove that the Spanish-language
interpreter did not meet her needs, she failed to carry her burden showing
that the Marin Court did not reasonably accommodate her disability. The
district court further stated that they had previously held that monetary

59.
60.

61.

62.

Id. at 632.
Id. at 633.
Id. (citing Ferguson, 157 F.3d at 675).
Memmer, 169 F.3d at 633.
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damages are not warranted in cases involving unintentional discrimination.
Therefore, even if Memmer could show that the Spanish-language
interpreter could not effectively assist her, her ADA claim would fail in the
of any evidence of discriminatory intent on the part of the Marin
absence
63
Court.

Prior to Ferguson,courts had not explicitly stated that a plaintiff had
to show discriminatory intent on the part of the defendant in order to be
able to recover monetary damages. While Memmer's case might not have
been a particularly strong one, if the discriminatory intent requirement had
not been applied she might have had some chance of recovery. Without the
intentional discrimination requirement, Memmer might have been able to
show that a Spanish-language interpreter was not a reasonable
accommodation for someone with a severe visual disability. Her argument
could have logically concluded that the lack of reasonable accommodation
constituted an ADA violation on the part of the Matin Court and merited
the award of monetary damages. Yet the court specifically relied on the
precedent set in Ferguson and stated explicitly that Memmer's failure to
prove discriminatory intent on the defendant's part was "fatal" to her
claim. 64 Rather than require proof of intentional discrimination, the court
should only have had to determine whether or not the defendant's actions
constituted a violation of Title II of the ADA, justifying an award of
damages. Because the court in Memmer concluded that Memmer could not
show intentional discrimination, it did not reach the issue of which standard
of intentional discrimination should be applied.
In the second post-Fergusoncase, Midgett v. Tri-County Metropolitan
TransportationDistrict of Oregon,65 the court continued to avoid deciding
which standard of intentional discrimination to apply. As in Memmer, the
court relied on its earlier decision in Ferguson when it required the plaintiff
to show proof of intentional discrimination before he could recover
compensatory damages.
Joseph Midgett, who has multiple sclerosis and is a "qualified
individual with a disability" under the ADA, 66 brought suit against the TriCounty Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon ("Tri-Met"). He
sought a permanent injunction and compensatory damages for alleged
violations of the ADA. Midgett experienced difficulty with the lifts on
multiple Tri-Met buses. Dissatisfied with the response he received from
63. Id.at 634.
64. id.
65. Midgett v. Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon, 254

F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2001).
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 - 12213.
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Tri-Met's customer service department, he sought an injunction compelling
Tri-Met to perform a wide range of activities, from implementing a system
of cross-checking operator reports with customer reports of lift failures to
67
posting the number of failures weekly on the Tri-Met website.
Tri-Met moved for summary judgment. It offered a report prepared
by the Federal Transit Administration finding Tri-Met in compliance with
the ADA as evidence that Midgett's reforms were unnecessary. Midgett
conceded that he could not contradict Tri-Met's evidence, despite his
offering of affidavits and declarations from himself and others detailing
individual instances of bus lift failures. 68 The district court concluded that
Midgett was not entitled to compensatory damages. In order to be awarded
compensatory damages under the ADA, he would have to have shown an
intentional violation, and his evidence did not indicate any discriminatory
intent on Tri-Met's part. 69 On appeal from the granting of Tri-Met's
summary judgment motion, Midgett argued that the district court erred by
ruling as a matter of law that he could not receive compensatory damages
without showing discriminatory intent. Midgett requested that the circuit
court overrule its previous decision requiring such intent.70
In Ferguson, the circuit court expressly held that a showing of
discriminatory intent was a prerequisite to obtaining compensatory
damages under the ADA. It did not, however, decide, "whether 'deliberate
indifference' or 'discriminatory animus' provided the appropriate level of
intent.",7' The circuit court stated that it was not free to overrule its
previous decision. It concluded that whatever standard was applied, the
record did not support a finding that Tri-Met violated the ADA and
affirmed the lower court's denial of Midgett's request for injunctive relief,
as well as its rejection of his claim for compensatory damages. 72
In this case, the circuit court refers to its express holding regarding
discriminatory intent in Ferguson and almost seems apologetic that it
cannot overrule that decision. "As a panel, we are not free to overrule that
decision.' 73 The court admits that it has not clarified the applicable
standard to determine discriminatory intent, and continues to decline to do
so. Like in Memmer, the court evidently did not see the need to clarify the
standard since it concluded that the plaintiffs claims failed under either

67.
68.

Midgett, 254 F.3d at 848.
Id. at 849.

70.

Id.at 851.

72.

Midgett, 254 F.3d at 851.

69. Id.
71.

Id.

73. Id.
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one. Once again, neither standard should have been applied. Midgett did
produce evidence documenting repeated failures on Tri-Met's part to meet
its Title H obligations. 74 That evidence alone should have been sufficient
for the court to consider awarding compensatory damages. Instead, the
court eliminated the possibility of awarding damages because of its earlier
decision in Ferguson.
Finally, in Duvall v. County of Kitsap,75 the court decided upon which
standard to apply when determining intentional discrimination.
Determining that the deliberate indifference standard was more suitable to
the goals of the ADA,76 the court eliminated the possibility of applying the
more stringent discriminatory animus standard.
Christopher Duvall, a severely hearing impaired individual, brought
suit against the county, among others, for failing to provide
accommodations during state court proceedings involving the dissolution
of his marriage. He claimed that by not providing him with real-time
transcription for his hearings, the defendants violated the ADA, the
Rehabilitation Act, and the Washington Law against Discrimination
The district court granted summary judgment to the
("WLAD").
defendants on all claims, and Duvall appealed.77
Duvall is completely deaf in one ear, severely hearing impaired in the
other, and does not sign well enough to use either American Sign Language
or Signed English.78 Therefore, his primary means of communication is
through the written word. 79 He wears custom-fitted hearing aids and can
communicate in spoken English in a one-on-one conversation using lip
reading and visual cues. 80 He finds following conversations that do not
him to suffer
involve him directly difficult, and attempting to do so causes
time.81
from headaches and tinnitus within a short period of
At the pre-trial hearing for his family law case involving the
dissolution of his marriage, Duvall experienced difficulty following the
82
The hearing took place in a courtroom specially equipped
proceedings.
for the hearing impaired, but the particular assistive devices could not be

74.
75.
76.

77.
78.

79.

80.

81.

82.

Id. at 848.

Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1139.
Id. at 1129.
ld. at 1129-30
Id. at 1130.
Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1130.
Id.
Id.
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used with his hearing aids. 83 Thus the devices made available to him in the
courtroom actually reduced his ability to understand what was taking place.
As a result of his difficulty, Duvall requested a videotext display, or realtime transcription, for his trial. There was some dispute over the timing of
his request prior to the trial. However, on the first day of trial Duvall's
attorney made a motion to the court requesting a videotext display to
accommodate Duvall's hearing impairment. 84 The judge denied the
motion.85
Although the judge denied Duvall's motion for a videotext display
during the trial, he did permit Duvall to move around the courtroom so that
he could find the position that best allowed him to hear.86 This method was
only partially successful. By moving around the courtroom and not sitting
next to his attorney, he was compelled to take notes to later discuss with his
attorney. He was unable to simultaneously take notes and follow the
proceedings, so he ultimately gave up and returned to his seat next to his
attorney. 8 Duvall next requested by letter a videotext display for a posttrial hearing from both the director of the Superior Court Administrative
Services/ADA coordinator for the Superior Court and the ADA coordinator
for the County. 88 The County ADA coordinator testified that she did have
the authority to arrange accommodations for Duvall, and that she discussed
Duvall's request with the Superior Court ADA coordinator, as well as with
the chairperson of the county ADA committee. 89 She also stated that she
responded to Duvall's written request by informing him that the hearing
would be held in the same specially equipped courtroom. At no time did
any county official make any effort to investigate if videotext display could
be provided to Duvall. Duvall brought a motion for a mistrial at the post-

83. Id.atl30-1131.
84. Id.
85. In a blatant display of insensitivity towards Mr. Duvall and his disability, the
judge remarked:
[Tihat's the way humans happen to communicate, I guess up until a very
recent time, with one another is orally. And I know that some courts in some
places have the ability to have, in effect, an on-line screen available through
the court reporter. We have not progressed to that technical degree in this
county, and I can only assume that if Mr. Duvall wished to have that service
available he can provide that service for himself.
Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1131 (alteration in original).
86. Id. at 1131.
87. Id. at 1131-32.
88. Id. at 1132.

89. Id.
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stating that real-time transcription
trial hearing, which the judge denied,
90
was not available in their county.
When the county ADA coordinator and the Superior Court ADA
coordinator investigated Duvall's complaints, they discovered that there
were firms in the county that could provide the accommodation that he had
Duvall also submitted
requested, namely real-time transcription. 9'
declarations from Seattle court reporters stating that they could have
provided videotext display at the time of his trial. Despite this information,
the county's ADA grievance committee denied Duvall's grievance and the
Board of County Commissioners denied his appeal.92 Duvall then filed suit
in federal district court alleging violations of Title H of the ADA, section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the WLAD, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
seeking declaratory and compensatory relief. The district court granted
summary judgment to all of the defendants on all of the claims and Duvall
appealed.
Duvall argued in his complaint that by not providing him with the
accommodation of a videotext display at his trial, Kitsap County and the
other defendants violated Title II of the ADA, section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and WLAD. 94 In contrast to Title II and section 504,
WLAD does not reuire a showing of intentional discrimination in suits for
monetary damages.
The primary issue examined by the circuit court was whether or not
the county was required to provide videotext display to Duvall as a
reasonable accommodation for his disability.9 6 The defendants argued that
the accommodation was not reasonable because it was not available in the
county at the time of Duvall's trial. Duvall's evidence, including
declarations of court reporters stating that they could have provided
videotext display in the county at the time, raised a triable issue of fact as

90.

91.
92.
93.
94.

Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1132.

Id.
id.

Id. at 1132-33.

Id. at 1135.

See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030(2) (West 2002) (providing that "[a]ny
person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of this chapter shall have a
civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the
actual damages sustained by the person, or both...") "Because we find that Duvall has
made a sufficient showing of intentional discrimination to survive summary judgment on his
ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, a fortiori he has made a sufficient showing of
discrimination under the WLAD as well." Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1136 n.10.
96. Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1136.

95.
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to whether the accommodation was reasonable. 97 Duvall also presented
deposition testimony that the superior court ADA coordinator had attended
a demonstration by a county court reporter of videotext display.
Additionally, the county ADA coordinator, when investigating Duvall's
request for accommodation, discovered firms that could have provided the
service. 98 The court pointed out that the ADA imposes an affirmative
obligation to investigate whether a requested accommodation is in fact
reasonable.
It noted that "'mere speculation that a suggested
accommodation is not feasible falls short of the reasonable accommodation
requirement; the Acts create a duty to gather sufficient information from
the disabled individual and qualified experts as needed to determine what
accommodations are necessary.. .. 99 When determining the appropriate
accommodation, the court stated that primary consideration must be given
to the accommodation requested by the individual with the disability.
It
concluded that the evidence strongly suggested that the defendants could
have provided Duvall with his requested accommodation if the0 had taken
the time to investigate the availability of real-time transcription.
Defendants, relying heavily on the court's earlier decision in Memmer,
argued that the accommodations provided were sufficient to accommodate
Duvall's disability. Unpersuaded, the court distinguished Memmer,
pointing out that the requested service in that case (aiding someone who
had visual impairment) did not require any special training. 10 2 Also,
Memmer never consulted with the offered Spanish-language interpreter to
determine if he could assist her.'0 3 In sharp contrast, Duvall examined the
court's accommodation prior to rejecting it.
Citing Ferguson, the court reiterated that in order to recover monetary
damages under Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's discriminatory acts
against him were intentional. After noting its repeated refusal in the past to
determine an appropriate standard for intentional discrimination under the

97.
98.

id.
Id.

99. Id. at 1136-37 (quoting Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 807,
818 (9th Cir. 1999)).
100. Id. at 1137.
101. Duiall, at 1137.
102. Id. at 1137-38.
103. Memmer, 169 F.3d at 634.
104. Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1138.
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standard would be deliberate
ADA, the court determined that the applicable
05
indifference, and not discriminatory animus.
In a footnote, the court reinforced its incorrect reasoning as to why it
adopted the intentional discrimination standard, saying:
[The decision] was premised upon the provisions of the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act requiring the remedies
available under those statutes to be construed the same as
remedies under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Supreme Court established in Guardians Association
v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, and
most recently confirmed in Alexander v. Sandoval that
'private individuals cannot recover compensatory damages
10 6
under Title VI except for intentional discrimination.'
Once again, the court failed to recognize the significant differences
between the ADA and the Civil Rights Act, among them that Congress
never intended for the ADA to require intentional discrimination before
compensatory damages could be recovered.
Rather than leave open to interpretation what a plaintiff must do to
satisfy the deliberate indifference test, the court specified that a plaintiff
must show that a public entity met a two-part test. First, a plaintiff must
show that the public entity had knowledge that harm to a federally
protected right was substantially likely to occur and second, that the public
entity failed to act upon that likelihood.10 7 When a plaintiff notifies the
public entity of his need for accommodation, or when the need is obvious
or required by statute or regulation, the public entity is on notice that the
plaintiff requires an accommodation. At that point, the plaintiff has
satisfied the first element of the test. 10 8 The court specified that deliberate
indifference requires more than "bureaucratic sli age that constitutes
negligence rather than deliberate action or inaction." w
"[D]eliberate indifference does not occur where a duty to act may
simply have been overlooked, or a complaint may reasonably have been
deemed to result from events taking their normal course. Rather, in order
to meet the second element of the deliberate indifference test, a failure to

105. Id.
106. Id. at 1138 n.12 (internal citations omitted).
107. Id. at 1139.

108. Id.

109. Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139.
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act must be a result of conduct that is more than negligent, and involves an
element of deliberateness."" 0
Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to Duvall, the
court determined that he did meet the deliberate indifference test. First, it
found that Duvall had presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue
as to whether two of the county defendants (the county ADA coordinator
and the chairperson of the Kitsap County ADA committee) had notice of
his repeated requests for accommodation. Second, despite this notice, the
defendants failed to take appropriate action. 1 '
The county ADA coordinator made a deliberate decision not to
provide Duvall with the videotext display without investigating whether or
not it would have been possible to provide him with his requested
accommodation. The chairperson of the county ADA committee merely
informed Duvall that his post-trial hearing would take place in the specially
equipped courtroom when he requested real-time transcription for that
hearing. Duvall had previously informed her that he was familiar with the
accommodations in that courtroom and that they were inadequate. Despite
receiving that information, she denied his request without determining
whether the courtroom's facilities would accommodate Duvall's needs.I
If Duvall accurately described his requests for accommodations and the
defendants' responses, "a trier of fact could conclude that defendants'
decisions not to accommodate him were considered and deliberate."1' 13 The
court concluded that, viewing the record as required on summary judgment,
Duvall had presented sufficient evidence to show deliberate indifference,
1 14
and thus intentional discrimination on the part of three of the defendants.,
It reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
county and three other defendants and remanded the case back to the
district court.' 15
Given the choice, deliberate indifference is certainly preferable to
discriminatory animus as the standard to determine whether or not a
defendant has intentionally discriminated against a plaintiff in violation of
Title II of the ADA. Rarely do the actions of public entities rise to the level
of discriminatory animus. Had the Ninth Circuit chosen the more stringent
of the two standards, even fewer plaintiffs would be eligible for an award
of compensatory damages. Some might view the court's decision as a

110. Id. at 1139 (internal citations omitted).

Ill. Id. at 1140.
112. Id.

113. id.

114. Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1140-41.

115. Id. at 1142.
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victory for plaintiffs. But it was not. It simply compounded the mistake
made in Ferguson, when the court created the intentional discrimination
requirement.
Unfortunately, in Duvall, the court chose not to take advantage of an
opportunity to rectify its earlier mistake. Even if the court was compelled
to choose a standard, it could have defined it in such a way that would have
allowed more plaintiffs to recover. Instead of eliminating damages in
instances of "bureaucratic slippage that constitutes negligence rather than
deliberate action or inaction,"' 1 6 the court could have allowed them.
Instead of declaring that "deliberate indifference does not occur where a
duty to act may simply have been overlooked, or a complaint may
reasonably have been deemed to result from events taking their normal
course,"" the court could have defined deliberate indifference as just that.
Had it done so, much of the damage done by the Ferguson decision might
have been avoided. The court could have created a standard that would not
have such a negative impact on the ability of a plaintiff suing under Title II
to recover compensatory damages.
Lovell v. Chandler" presented the Ninth Circuit with its first
opportunity to apply the deliberate indifference standard set forth in Duvall.
"In an underlying class action suit, the district court granted partial
summary judgment for plaintiffs against the State of Hawaii ("the State")
on the issues of unlawful discrimination and general liability for
compensatory damages under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act and [section 504] of the Rehabilitation Act."' 19 The plaintiffs brought
the case to protest the State's exclusion of people with certain disabilities
from its health insurance programs.120
The State of Hawaii, recognizing that many people in need of medical
benefits did not qualify for Medicaid, created a program to serve those who
could not meet Medicaid's stringent income and asset test.' 21 The State
Health Insurance Program ("SHIP") was a limited fee-for-service ("FFS")
program, and included some participants who were aged, blind, or disabled.
The State then launched a new program, QUEST, to begin transitioning its
FFS programs into more cost-effective HMO-based plans. Participants in
various programs, including SHIP, were eligible to receive benefits under
QUEST if they met the income requirements, unless they were aged, blind
116. Id.at 1139-40.
117. Id.

118. Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2002).
119. Id. at 1044 (citation omitted).

120. Id.

121. Id. at 1045.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23

or disabled. QUEST's categorical requirements stated that two groups of
individuals were ineligible to participate in Hawaii Health Quest:
(1) Persons who are age sixty-five or older.
(2) Persons who are blind or disabled according to the
22
criteria employed by the Social Security Administration.'
All aged, blind, and disabled people who met the Medicaid
requirements could receive Medicaid benefits. However, those who did not
meet the Medicaid requirements, and who had been receiving benefits in23
the SHIP program, were excluded from participating in QUEST.
Ultimately, the state amended the QUEST to exclude all SHIP participants,
but the plaintiffs
based their claim on the program as it existed prior to the
24
amendments. 1
A disabled minor, Shea Burns-Vidlak, and a blind adult, George
Cohn, filed complaints in federal district court against the Director of the
Hawaii Department of Human Services, Susan Chandler, and upon
amendment, against the State of Hawaii. The plaintiffs alleged the
defendants had violated Title II of the ADA and section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act by excluding the aged, blind, and disabled from
participating in QUEST, and filed a motion for partial summary judgment.
Despite the numerous defenses raised by the State, the court granted the
plaintiffs' motion, concluding that the categorical exclusion of otherwisequalified people with disabilities violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act. The court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to compensatory
25
damages, but did not calculate award amounts for specific individuals.1
Prior to the court's ruling, the plaintiffs had filed a motion for class
certification, which was granted in part after the court had found in favor of
the plaintiffs on the issue of compensatory damages. 26 The court held that
class treatment was appropriate for general liability for compensatory
damages. However, individual class members would have to file separate
actions to determine the exact amount the State owed them in
compensatory damages. In a clarifying order regarding compensatory
damages, the district court stated that because the State had engaged in

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 1045.
Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1046-47.
Id. at 1046.
Id.
Id. at 1046-47.
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127
intentional discrimination, compensatory damages were warranted.
Richard Lovell and Douglas Delmendo were two of over 300 plaintiffs who
filed individual actions for compensatory damages in the Hawaii district

court. 128 The court awarded Lovell $10,192.22 and Delmendo $1,053.21 at

the conclusion of separate bench trials, plus attorneys' fees, costs, and
prejudgment interest.

In awarding Lovell and Delmendo compensatory damages, the trial
court relied on the district court's granting of summary judgment to the
Burns-Vidlak class on the question of unlawful discrimination under Title
II of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 30 The State then
challenged the holding that it had engaged in unlawful discrimination. The
circuit court affirmed the district court's determination that Lovell and
Delmendo were entitled to compensatory damages as a matter of law,
despite the State's argument that it had acted in "good faith," and therefore
did not "intentionally discriminate" against them. 13' A determination that
the State had discriminated intentionally against Lovell and Delmendo
justified the court's decision to award them compensatory damages. The
court cited its earlier decision in Ferguson to make compensatory damages
contingent upon a finding of intentional discrimination. 132 Therefore,
because the men were able to show such discrimination, they were entitled
to compensatory damages.
The circuit court went on to review the "deliberate indifference"
standard it established in Duvall.133 It pointed out that Duvall, Memmer,
and other similar cases, involved a public entity whose failure to provide a
reasonable accommodation or whose implementation of particular policies
caused a disparate impact on people with disabilities. 34 In sharp contrast,
the court noted, this case involved facial discrimination through the
categorical exclusion of people with disabilities from a public program.135
"In such a case, the public entity is, at the very least, 'deliberately
' 136
indifferent'; by its very terms facial discrimination is 'intentional."

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 1047.
Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1047.
Id.
Id. at 1052.
Id. at 1056.
id.
133. Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1056.
134. Id. at 1056-57.

135. Id. at 1057.
136. Id. at 1057 (citation omitted).
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Applying the Duvall standard to Lovell's and Delmendo's cases, the
court found the State had acted with "deliberate indifference," and had
therefore engaged in "intentional discrimination."'' 37 Meeting the first
prong of the Duvall standard, the State was chargeable with notice that
federal rights were implicated by instituting a program that facially
discriminated against people with disabilities. The State satisfied the
second prong of the standard by failing to act with the requisite care to
protect the rights of people with disabilities. It did so by categorically
excluding people with disabilities from QUEST, despite the knowledge that
by doing so those people would be excluded from health care coverage.138
The circuit court affirmed that its finding of intentional discrimination
did not interfere with the purpose of the statutory limitation on
compensatory damages. It referred to the Supreme Court's conclusion that
the purpose of requiring proof of intent for such damages is to ensure that
the public entity had knowledge and notice,
and is not to measure
139
institutional ill will toward a protected group.
By categorically excluding all disabled persons from
QUEST, the State had knowledge of its own facially
discriminatory conduct and notice of the effects of its
conduct on Lovell, Delmendo, and similarly situated
disabled people. In so discriminating, and in failing to
alleviate the impact of this discrimination on the disabled
who remained without any coverage, the State acted with
at least deliberate indifference. Accordingly, regardless of
the State's asserted long-term motivations or competing
interests, we conclude that the State's facial exclusion of
the disabled from QUEST entitles Lovell and
Delmendo to
40
compensatory damages as a matter of law. 1
As the court points out in its opinion, the facts of this case are easily
distinguished from those in previous cases in which plaintiffs claimed that
a public entity violated Title II and section 504. In Duvall, the plaintiff had
to show that the county's policy of not providing him with real-time
transcription had a discriminatory impact on him. Contrastingly, Lovell
and Delmendo only had to offer as evidence the State's own categorical

137. Id.
138. Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1057.

139. Id.

140. Id. at 1057-58.
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exclusions to show that the State had discriminated against them. It seems
highly unlikely that a facially discriminatory policy will frequently be the
source of a lawsuit alleging Title II and section 504 violations. Clearly, the
deliberate indifference standard decided upon is an easier standard to meet
than a discriminatory animus standard. Lovell and Delmendo prevailed
primarily because a policy that contains explicit discrimination could, at
least theoretically, meet any standard of discrimination applied. But the
fact that any standard at all has to be met drastically reduces the chance a
plaintiff will have for recovering compensatory damages for ADA and
Rehabilitation Act violations.
B. SECOND AND TENTH CIRCUIT CASES FOLLOWING FERGUSON

In Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Center of Brooklyn, 141 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided the same issue addressed by the
Ninth Circuit in Duvall, but came to the opposite conclusion. Unlike the
Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit concluded that when determining if a
defendant has intentionally discriminated against a plaintiff claiming
discrimination under Title II of the ADA, the discriminatory animus
standard should apply. 142
After repeatedly failing the first-year curriculum at State University of
New York Health Sciences Center at Brooklyn ("SUNY"), Francisco
Garcia appealed his dismissal from the school. 143 Subsequent to his
dismissal, a psychologist diagnosed Garcia as having attention deficit
disorder and a learning disability. 44 Because Garcia and SUNY could not
agree as to the terms of Garcia's readmission, Garcia brought suit against
SUNY and several SUNY employees, claiming, among other things, that
they had violated Title II of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. The district court dismissed the complaint, Garcia appealed, and the
45
circuit court affirmed the dismissal. 1
Before reaching the issue of whether or not Garcia would be entitled
to compensatory damages under Title II, the circuit court examined the
interplay between the Eleventh Amendment, and in particular its
background of state sovereign immunity, and the ADA. The court noted
that sovereign immunity of a state is not absolute, and that Congress

141. Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sci. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2001).
142. Id. at 11.

143. Id. at 103.
144. Id. at 103-04.
145. Id. at 104.
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intended to abrogate sovereign immunity with respect to Title 11.146
However, the court pointed out that Congress's authority to enact Title H
derives from both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This fact raised a question as to whether or not Congress
rightly exercised its authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity through
the enactment of Title H. Under the Commerce Clause, Title II cannot
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity because "'Congress may not...
base its abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity upon the
powers enumerated in Article I.,,, 147 Examining Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the court stated that under that amendment,
Congress does have the authority to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity.
The court then turned to the question of whether or not Title H was within
Congress's authority under Section 5.148
"Where disability discrimination is at issue," the court stated, "the
Fourteenth Amendment only proscribes government conduct for which
there is no rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and
some legitimate governmental purpose."' 49 Assessing the requirements of
Title II against several baseline considerations applied under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the court concluded that Title H was neither proportional nor
congruent to the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment.15° The court
noted, among other things, that the Fourteenth Amendment allows people
with disabilities to be treated differently so long as the unequal treatment
has a rational relationship to a legitimate government end.' 5'
Contrastingly, Title II focuses on the disparate impact of governmental
treatment on people with disabilities separate from any question of
' The court found that Title II in its entirety did exceed Congress's
intent. "52
authority under Section 5, but that that conclusion alone did not answer the
question of whether Title II validly abrogated state sovereign immunity.
According to the court, "Title II need only comport with Congress's
Section 5 authority to the extent
' 53 that the title allows private damage suits
against states for violations."'
Title II does not specifically state when plaintiffs may recover
monetary damages. Instead, it incorporates the remedial scheme of the

146. Garcia, 280 F.3d at 108.
147. Id. (quoting Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 962 (2001)).
148. Id. at 108-09.

149. Id. at 109.

150. Id.
151. Garcia, 280 F.3d at 110.

152. Id.
153. Id.
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Rehabilitation Act, which in turn incorporates the remedial scheme of Title
VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.' 54 Title VI's remedial scheme includes a
judicially implied right of action, so therefore Title II of the ADA also
incorporates an implied private right of action.
Latitude to adopt an
appropriate remedial scheme to best suit the statute accompanies an
implied judicial right of action. The court believed that such latitude,
"allows us to restrict the availability of Title II monetary suits against the
states in a manner that is consistent with Congress's Section 5 authority,
and that thereby validly abrogates state sovereign immunity from private
monetary suits under Title II.,,156 The court concluded that in order to limit
monetary suits to comport with Congress's Section 5 authority, plaintiffs
should be required to show that the Title H violation "was motivated by
discriminatory animus or ill will based on the plaintiffs disability.' ' 57
In deciding upon discriminatory animus or ill will as the applicable
standard, the court rejected the application of a lesser standard, arguing that
to do so would not achieve the proportionality and congruence required by
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 58 The court concluded that state
governments would incur monetary liability for engaging in
constitutionally permissible conduct if the court applied a standard which
only required proof of an intentional or willful Title II violation. 159 Having
decided which standard to apply, the court then stated that Garcia failed to
meet that standard. Because Garcia made no allegations of discriminatory
animus or ill will based on disability in his claim against SUNY, the court
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing it.160
Unfortunately, the court in this case made the same mistake as did the
Ferguson court.
In following the convoluted road leading to a
determination of remedies available to Title H plaintiffs, the Garcia court
does not consider the key differences between Title II and both the
Rehabilitation Act and Title VI. Title IHof the ADA is not Spending
Clause legislation, nor does it contain any congressional restrictions on the
award of damages. The court compounds its mistake by then concluding
that based on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it should apply a
standard that requires Title II plaintiffs to prove discriminatory animus or
ill will based on plaintiffs' disabilities. This standard is inappropriate

154. Id. at 111.

155. Id.

156. Garcia,280 F.3d at 111.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 112.

159. Id.
160. Id. at 112-113.
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based on the ADA's purpose of eliminating discrimination against people
with disabilities. It is also inappropriate in the face of Congress's failure to
state any limitation on remedies available under Title II. By requiring
discriminatory animus or ill will, the Second Circuit is practically
eliminating any possibility of ever recovering damages under Title II of the
ADA. Most cases involving Title II violations by a local or state
government involve disparate impact discrimination, not intentional
discrimination.161 Requiring discriminatory animus effectively eviscerates
the protections Congress intended Title 1I to provide to people with
disabilities.
In Davoll v. City & County of Denver,'62 the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals examined, among other things, whether the district court erred in
its jury instruction on the issue of compensatory damages. 63 Because at
the time the district court gave the instruction the law was still evolving on
the subject, the circuit court concluded that it was reasonable not to require
64
intentional discrimination prior to awarding compensatory damages.
Three former Denver police officers brought suit against the City and
Count 'of Denver for violating their rights under Titles I and II of the
ADA. The City's policy forbidding disabled officers from transferring to
other vacant positions in the city government forced the officers to retire
after being injured in the line of duty.' 66 After consolidating various
claims, those ADA claims not already decided by the court on a summary
judgment motion were tried to a jury, which awarded $800,000 in
from the
compensatory damages to the three officers. 1 67 Denver appealed
68
things.
other
among
instructions,
jury
contesting
trial verdict,
Denver maintained two separate personnel systems: the Classified
Service, comprised of police officers and firefighters, and the Career
Service, made up of all other city employees. If officers in the Classified
Service became disabled, they could continue to work so long as their
condition was improving. 69 Injured officers whose condition was no
longer improving did not have the option of transferring to a position
within the Career Service, even those positions within the police

Tucker, supra note 16, at 370.
Davoll v. City & County of Denver, 194 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 1999).
Id. at i141.
Id. at 1142.
165. Id. at 1124.
166. Id. at 1125.
167. Davoll, 194 F.3d at 1124-25.
168. Id. at 1125.
169. Id. at 1126.

161.
162.
163.
164.
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department. At trial, Denver claimed that allowing such transfers would
hurt employee morale, but offered no evidence as to the cost of doing so, or
of any attempt to consolidate the two personnel services. The jury found
that the defendants would not suffer any undue burden if the plaintiffs were
reassigned from the Classified to the Career Service system.
Denver argued on appeal that the district court erred by not instructing
the jury that Title II required the plaintiffs to show intentional
discrimination in order to receive compensatory damages. 17' Because the
City did not raise this issue below, as required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 51, the circuit court reviewed for plain error the district court's
instruction on compensatory damages.
At the time the district court gave
the contested instruction, in 1996, the law was unsettled as to whether Title
II plaintiffs had to prove intentional discrimination in order to receive an
award of compensatory damages. The circuit court stated that because the
law was unsettled, it did not constitute plain error to instruct the jury one
173
way or the other.
The circuit court noted that the Supreme Court has recognized that
statutes enacted pursuant to Congress's spending power should not expose
funding recipients to compensatory damages liability for unintentional
violations. 74 Like the dissent in Ferguson, the circuit court recognized that
the ADA was not enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, as was the
Rehabilitation Act, but rather pursuant to the Commerce Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment. "Title II entities are not necessarily recipients of
federal funds, and the arguments against liability for compensatory
damages absent intent are arguably less relevant. One could therefore
contend that intent should not be required for Title II violations, even if it is
required for Rehabilitation Act violations."'' 75 Based on this analysis, the
circuit court concluded that the instruction was not plain error because it
176
was a plausible interpretation of the law.
The Tenth Circuit successfully recognized in Davoll what the Second
Circuit in Garciaand what the Ninth Circuit in the four above-mentioned
cases failed to acknowledge: Title II of the ADA is not Spending Clause
legislation and thus should not be evaluated as such. Placing Title II in the
same category as Spending Clause legislation led the Second and the Ninth
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172. Davoll, 194 F.3d at 1141.
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Circuits to reach the conclusion that a plaintiff must show intentional
discrimination in order to receive compensatory damages. Those circuits
could have avoided reaching this incorrect conclusion had they not applied
legislation, and inapplicable to
case law applicable to Spending Clause
77
legislation.1
Amendment
Fourteenth

177. It is not only the circuit courts that have struggled with this issue. A recent
decision on a summary judgment motion from the District Court is illustrative. In Smith v.
Maine School Admin. Dist. No. 6, Lacey Smith, a sixth grade student with disabilities, and
her parents brought suit against Maine School Administrative District No. 6 ("MSAD No.
6"), claiming that the school violated the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Maine
Human Rights Act. NO. 00-284-P-C, 2001 WL 420361 (D. Me. April 24, 2001).
Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims.
MSAD No. 6 placed Lacey in a special education program that included both sixth
and seventh grade students. Only seventh and eighth grade students were allowed to attend
school dances. After two different educational technicians stated that Lacey could attend
the dance, Lacey went to the seventh and eighth grade dance. Once there, the vice principal
informed the principal that several sixth grade students from the mixed sixth and seventh
grade class were in attendance. Despite the sixth graders being in a seventh grade class, the
principal instructed the vice principal to remove them from the dance because they were not
allowed to be there. After the dance, both the principal and vice principal received
disciplinary letters, and MSAD No. 6 adopted a new policy allowing sixth graders in mixed
grade classes to attend school dances.
On another occasion, Lacey attended a choral concert as a member of the chorus.
Although she was initially asked to sit separately from the other participants, ultimately she
did sit with the rest of the chorus. However, during the concert Lacey sang loudly and
another student tapped her on the shoulder, apparently in an attempt to have Lacey lower her
voice.
In regards to the choral concert, the district court found that the plaintiffs failed to
submit sufficient evidence that any of the applicable statutes had been violated. The court
therefore granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to any claims
arising out of the concert. The defendants also argued that they were entitled to summary
judgment on any statutory claims of discrimination arising out of the school dance, but the
court disagreed.
The defendants claimed that the plaintiffs must show intentional discrimination, while
the plaintiffs responded that intentional discrimination was not required, or in the
alternative, that they presented sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination. The district
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument and stated the two ways in which they could show
intentional discrimination. Discriminatory animus or ill will would be the more stringent
standard. Deliberate indifference to the likelihood that a federally protected right would be
violated as a result of the defendant's action would be the lesser standard. First applying the
discriminatory animus standard, the court found that no reading of the facts indicated that
any of the defendants had any ill will or personal animosity towards Lacey because of her
disability. However, the court reached a different result when applying the deliberate
indifference standard. The plaintiffs offered evidence that both the principal and vice
principal had received some training in the ADA. Additionally, both knew that the sixth
grade students being excluded from the dance were special education students from a mixed
grade class who had permission to attend the dance. With those facts, the court concluded
that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that the defendants "acted with deliberate
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CONCLUSION

Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination against people with
disabilities by state and local governments. The ADA's statutory language,
the legislative history of Title II, and subsequent amendments to other titles
of the ADA, all indicate that Congress never intended for plaintiffs suing
under Title H to prove intentional discrimination as a prerequisite to the
award of compensatory damages. All appropriate remedies should be
available to plaintiffs who have suffered from disability discrimination, as
is necessary to carry out the ADA's purpose. By creating the intentional
discrimination requirement in Ferguson, the Ninth Circuit failed to
recognize that its decision would seriously thwart the stated purpose of
Title 11. Instead of motivating state and local governments to comply with
Title H, this decision provided an incentive for them to perpetuate
discrimination against people with disabilities. 78 Even the deliberate
indifference standard requires that the governmental entity have notice that
harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely to occur. By
avoiding being put on notice, or by merely attributing potential harm to a
federally protected right to a bureaucratic slip or oversight, a state or local
government could avoid liability for violating Title H.
The Ferguson decision had and continues to have a seriously
detrimental impact on plaintiffs bringing disability discrimination suits
under Title II of the ADA. The Ninth Circuit in Duvall, unable to overrule
Ferguson, could have crafted a standard for determining intentional
discrimination that would not have had such a deleterious effect on
plaintiffs. Simply proving that a governmental entity has violated Title H1
alone should be sufficient for a plaintiff to recover for disability
discrimination and could have been enough to show deliberate indifference.
Instead, even the lesser deliberate indifference standard prevents Title II
plaintiffs from recovering damages by requiring proof of intentional
discrimination rather than just proof of a Title II violation. The Ninth
Circuit's decision has severely limited the ability of Title II of the ADA to
protect people with disabilities from unlawful discrimination, as it was
intended to do.

indifference to the strong possibility that a violation of Lacey's rights under the ADA would
result from their actions." Id. at *7. Therefore, the court found that MSAD No. 6 was not
entitled to summary judgment on the statutory claims.
178. Tucker, supra note 16, at 371.

